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List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 81-184 
UNITED STATES 
(intervenor in Bankruptcy Court) 
v. 
SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK,et al. 
(secured creditors) Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: The question presented is whether a provision 
of the new Bankruptcy Act--allowing a debtor to keep some household 
goods, some other personal items, and some tools of his trade--
o~erates to deprive secured creditors whose interest predates the 
Act of their property without due process of ' law. 
2. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: The new bankruptcy law was 
enacted in 1978. In a provision applicable in personal bankruptcy, 
~ a 
Bankruptcy Act §522(d) (3), (4), (6), & (9), 11 u.s.c. §522(d) (3), 
(4), (6), & (9) (Supp. III) the Act exempts (and thereby allows the 
debtor to keep) the following items from the "bankrupt estate": (1) 
household goods, furnishings, appliances, books, animals, crops, and .,.. -w- ; 
musical instruments held primarily for the personal, family or 
household use of the debtor or his dependent (a maximum of $200 per 
item is exempted): (2) jewelry held primarily for personal, family, 
or household use of the debtor or his dependent (a maximum of $500 
total is exempted): (3) any implements, professional books, or 
tools of the debtor's trade or the trade of his dependent (a maximum 
of $750 is exempted): and (4) professionally prescribed health aids 
for the debtor or his dependent. 
This case involves seven different suits brought in four 
bankruptcy courts and consolidated on appeal to the CAlO. In each 
case, a creditor acquired a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money ~~ 
~ 
security interest in the debtor's household funishings and ~-~ 
appliances before the President signed the new Bankruptcy Ac~
law. In each case, the debtor instituted a bankruptcy proceeding ~ 
after Oct. 1, 1979, the :;fective date of the Act, and claimed  
exemptions for the items under §522(d). In each case, the creditors 
objected to the exemptions on the ground that their property had 
been taken without due process. 
3. 
Pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §2403(a), the United States was 
notified that the constitutionality of a federal statute had been 
drawn into question, and the United States intervened in each 
bankruptcy court to defend the constitutionality of the statute. In 
each case, the ~a~rupcy court ruled against the d~tor. 
The CAlO affirmed. The court held that Congress intended cA ID 
~ 
the Bankruptcy Act to apply retrospectively and that such 
application was~nconstitutional under Louisville Joint Stock Land ~~d{cJ 
Bank v. Radford,--295 u.s. 555 (1935). The court did not explici?fy~~ 
state which clause of the fifth amendment was violated, though it ~~ 
did note that the statute effected a "complete taking of the secure~ 
creditors' property interests" in these cases. ,...-::::? 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that the question 
presented in this appeal is substantial. He reports that the 
' ' 
section's constitutionality has been at issue "in a flood of 
litigation." Of the seven cases filed initially in four bankruptcy 
courts and consolidated in the CAlO proceeding, three courts held 
(in five cases) that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to pre-
enactment security interests and one court held (in two cases) that 
the statute should be construed as applying only prospectively so as 
to avoid constitutional problems. In addition, the SG cites 15 
bankruptcy courts that have held the statute constitutional as 
applied to pre-enactment security interests and 7 other courts that 
have held it unconstitutional. Another four have avoided the 
constitutional issue by holding that Congress did not intend 
retroactive application. Although no other CA has, as yet, ruled on 
the issue, the CA7 heard argument in a case raising the same issue 
4. 
on Sept. 21, 1981, and the CA4 is scheduled to hear argument in such 
a case on Oct. 5. 
The SG also argues that the CAlO took too narrow a view of 
Congress' power to regulate bankruptcy in overruling retrospective 
application of the statute in the case at bar. He is, however, 
unable to cite any case upholding a similar interference with 
secured creditors' rights. 
The courts holding the statute unconstitutional have relied 
heavily onVZouisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), which 
held unconstitutional a provision enacted in 1934 limiting a 
mortgagee's ability to perfect, after default, his interest in farms 
mortgaged to him prior to default. The SG tries to limit Radford 
its facts by interpreting it as simply a holding that, in that 
instance, Congress went too far. 
4. DISCUSSION: The question presented appears to be 
substantial. In Radford, the Court held that the fifth amendment ~~ 
applies to bankruptcy statutes and that Congress can not take a ~ 
h!J~· 
specific piece of property from one person and give it to another.~~~ 
R dford can be distinguished on the ground that it involved a 
secured interest in a specific piece of land rather than a floating 
lien (household goods, for example, may come and go under the -nonpossessory, non-purchase money interest present in the case at 
bar) over certain categories of personal possessions. That 
dif!eren~e ~~s, however, rather technical, and the effect of the ~ 
recent act is not unlike the act challenged in Radford. 
I recommend a note of probable jurisdiction. There is no 
opposition. 
5. 
09/22/81 Becker Opin in petn 
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SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK, et al. 
Motion of Solicitor General 
to Defer Brleflng and Oral ' 
ArgumE:mt 
CA 10 
SUMt1ARY: After probable jurisdiction was noted in this case 
the SG as appellant discovered legislation pending in Congress that 
would, if enacted, render this case moot. He now moves to defer 
briefing and oral argument in the belief that final action on the 
bill will be taken in the spring. An opposition to the motion has 
been filed by one of the appellees. 
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS: The Court noted probable jurisdiction 
in this case on December 14, 1981 to determine whether §522(f) (2) 
of the Bankruptcy Code violates the Fifth Amendment ·as applied to 
certain security inte~ests acquired before enactment of that section. 
~ 






The SG advises that . subsequent to the NPJ, he discovered that 
H.R. 4786 had been introduced in the House of Representatives on 
October 20, 1981. He submits that among the amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code that the bill would effect is the repeal of that 
!/ 
portion of §522(f) (2) which is at issue in these proceedings. 
As such, he argues that the case would become moot if the bill is 
enacted . He adds that there is a substantial possibility that 
final action on the bill may be taken this spring. 
OPPOSITION: Beneficial Finance of Kansas , one of the appellees, 
opposes the SG's motion contending: (1) that passage of the bill 
is by no means certain because it is controversial and still in an 
early stage of the legislative process; (2) that even assuming 
passage, there is no reason to believe enactment would take place 
prior to the end of this Term; (3) that the specific amendment at 
issue here may not survive the legislative process; (4} that the 
case will not be rendered moot because the proposed legislation 
does not purport to be retroactive; and (5) that the constitutionality 
of retroactive invalidation of judicial liens will remain to be 
litigated even if the proposed legislation invalidates judicial 
liens which attached prior to enactment of §522(f) (2). 
Further, Beneficial submits that this case should proceed to 
resolution since its underlying issue, i.e., constitutionality of 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, is currently proceeding 
. ,, 
!/Section 8(c) of the bill provides: 
Section 522(f) of title 11, United States 
Code, is amended by striking out "lien is" and 
all that follows through the period and insert-







t oward r esolution in two ot h e r cases where probable jurisdict ion 
2/ 
was noted . -
DIS CU SSION : F i r s t , Be ne fici al ' s cl aim that t his case i s 
s ubst ant i ally similar to No . 81-1 50 and No. 81-5 46 seems be li e d · 
by the fact that on December 14, 1 981 , the Court denied Beneficial ' s 
motion to consolidate with those two appeals . 
Secondly, it does appear that the proposed legislation goes 
t o the heart of the issue presen ted in this appeal . Caution ~1d 
judicial economy wo uld seem to dictate that the Court await fina l 
action on the bill, assuming "normal" legislative progress. 
A CFR from the rema ining parties might be helpful (with a view 
toward a grant) . 
1/6/82 Caldwell 
PJC 
~Beneficial observes that probable jurisdiction was noted 
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Ma rathon Pipel i ne Co., 
No. 81-150, and United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co., No. 81-546. 
These cases appealed from a judgment holding that the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act unconstitutionally grants "extended jurisdiction" to 
non-Article III bankruptcy judges. 
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SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK, et al. 
I 
Motion to Dispense with 
Printing Joint Appendix 
~~: The SG, on behalf of the appellant (United States) and with 
consent of the appellees, seeks leave to dispense with filing a joint 
appendix. Probable jurisdiction was noted on December 7, 1981. 
P-lSCQ§§lQN: This case addresses the constitutionality of §522(f)(2) of 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as applied to 
before'the Act. The SG ~ates that the issue is 
that the parties do not intend to rely on any matters not already printed in 
the appendix to the petn. Because the issue is apparently a legal one and any 
--------------~'-necesary reference materials are already before the Court, the motion should 
be granted. 




April 16, 1982 Conference 
List 5 , Sheet 2 
No. 81-184 
UNITED STATES (Intervenor 
in Bankruptcy Court) 
.._./ v . 
SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK, 
et al. (Secured Creditors) 
D 
I 
Motion of Appellee Beneficial 
Finance of Kansas, Inc. to Schedule 
Oral Argument During April, 1982 
Session 
SUMMARY : Noting that only the SG ' s reply brief remains to be filed , 
resps move to schedule oral argument during the April session and dispose of 
this case in the 1982 Term. This case involves the question of whether the 
new Bankruptcy Act deprives secured creditors (such as resps) of due process 
~------~~~--------
by permitting debtors to retain various goods and property. 
CONTENTIONS : Resps argue that: ( 1) Because of the diminishing value of 
the secured interests in this case, time works to the detriment of the resps 
who are being deprived of their right to the property . (2) Severe injustice 
will fall on those creditors who must await final resolution of this case; the 
importance of prompt disposition is demonstrated by the accelerated handling 




unconstitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act--an issue also presented in the 
Northern Pipeline cases now set for argument on April 27. The relationship of 
these cases thus counsels joint consideration. 
DISCUSSION: Although disposition of the Northern Pipeline cases may have 
' 
. some impact on this case, resps have not demonstrated any compelling reasons 
for accelerating oral arguments at this late date. 
Therefore, the motion should be denied. 
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United States v. Security Industrial Bank 
Michael F. Sturley September 29, 1982 
Questions Presented 
(1) Does Bankruptcy Code §522 (f) (2), which allows an 
individual debtor to avoid certain nonpossessory, nonpurchase-
money security interests, apply retroactively? 
(2) If so, does retroactive application violate the 
Fifth Amendment? 
bench memo: u.s .. v. Security Industrial Bank 
Outline of Memorandum 
I. Background 
A. The Statute 
B. Facts 
c. Decisions Below 
II. Discussion 
A. The Legal Rights Involved 









(1) Radford and its Continued Validity. 6 
(2) The Application of Radford. 10 
(3) The Advisability of Overruling Radford. 14 
c. Constitutionality under the Due Process Clause 15 
D. The Proper Construction of §522 (f) (2) 16 
III. Conclusion 19 
bench memo: u.s~ v. Security Industrial Bank page 2. 
I. Background 
A. The Statute 
Under the rationale that bankruptcy should provide debt-
ors with a "fresh start," §522 of the new Bankruptcy Code (the 
"Code") governs exemptions. Subsection (b) allows an individual 
debtor to exempt certain property from his estate, including the 
property specified in subsection (d) (unless state law explicitly 
rejects this federal list). Subsection (d) (3), for example, in-
eludes household furnishings and appliances valued at less than 
$200 each. Under subsection (c), exempt property generally is 
not subject to creditors' claims. To prevent circumvention of 
§522, subsection (e) invalidates waivers of exemptions. Similar---- ---------------------------- " ,. . ~ 
ly, subsection (f) governs certain security interests: " ~
Not~itbstanding an~ waiver of exemptions, the ~ 
debtor ~id the fixing of a lien on an interest of 
the debtor in property to the extent that such lien 
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have 
been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if 
such lien is--
* * * 
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money secu-
rity interest in any--
(A) household furnishings, household 
goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, 
animals, crops, musical instruments, or jew-
elry that are held primarily for the person-
al, family, or household use of the debtor or 
a dependent of the debtor; 
(B) implements, professional books, or 
tools, of the trade or the debtor or the 
trade of a dependent of the debtor; or 
(C) professionally prescribed health 
aids for the debtor or a dependent of the 
debtor. 
11 u.s.c. §522(f) (Supp. IV). Under the previous Bankruptcy Act 
/ -----....... 
(the "Bankruptcy Act"), exemptions were governed principally by 
state law. 11 u.s.c. §24 (1976). 
bench memo: u.s._ v. Security Industrial Bark page 3. 
B. Facts 
Before the passage of the Code, various individuals (the 
"Debtors"), nominal appellees here, granted nonpossessory, 
nonpurchase-money security interests in their household furnish-
ings and appliances to ap'ees banks and finance companies (the 
"Creditors"). After the effective date of the Code, the Debtors 
instituted bankruptcy proceedings, claiming exemptions under §522 
for items that were subject to the Creditors' security interests. 
c. Decisions Below 
Each Debtor filed a complaint in bankruptcy court to 
avoid the Creditor's lien under §522(f) (2). Each Creditor moved 
to dismiss the complaint, arguing that application of §522(f) (2) 
to a security interest acquired before passage of the Code vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment. The United States intervened in each 
case to defend the constitutionality of the provision. 
In two cases, the bankruptcy court dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that Congress had not intended §522(f) (2) to 
apply retroactively. In five cases, the bankruptcy court held 
that Congress had intended retroactive application, but neverthe-
less dismissed the complaint on the ground that §522(f) (2), as 
thus applied, violated the Fifth Amendment. 
The seven cases were consolidated for appeal. CAlO de-
-------------~'-- ~ ~ cided that Congress had intended §522(f) (2) to apply retroactive-
ly, but relying on Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 
295 u.s. 555 (1935), it held that this application of §522 (f) (2) 
violated the Fifth Amendment. 
bench memo: u.s .. v. Security Industrial Bar'lk page 4. 
II. Discussion 
As a logical matter, the first question to arise is the 
proper construction of §522. In the present case, however, the 
proper construction of the section depends in large measure on 
the constitutionality of its retroactive application. I will 
begin, therefore, with a discussion of the constitutional impli-
cations of retroactivity, and then discuss whether this is what 
Congress intended. 
A. The Legal Rights Involved 
There is considerable confusion about the legal status 
of a creditor with a nonpossessory security interest. Some is 
evident in the parties' briefs; greater confusion may be found in 
various lower court opinions addressing this issue, and in the 
secondary literature commenting on those cases. To clarify the 
subsequent discussion, I begin with a brief summary of my analy-
sis of the legal rights involved. Strictly speaking, these 
~~~~i;hts are d:::;;ined by stat;~law, and could vary from state to 
~state. The governing principles, however, are either well estab-
~~hed by common law, or codified 
_,.~They should 
~ ~'-' the debtor will owe money to the 
~redito and the debt will be secured by a "security interest" 
~v:~~pecific, identified collateral, which may or may not be worth 
~ more than the debt. The creditor has both a contract interest 
and a property interest. His contract interest, which is inde-
pendent of the security, is in the debtor's obligation to repay 
bench memo: u.S - v. Security Industrial Ba · ,, page 5. 
the debt. If the collateral is destroyed, for example, the obli-
gation to repay the debt will remain. Or if the security inter-
est is worth less than the debt, the creditor has the right to a 
deficiency judgment. 
The "security interest" itself is a property interest in 
-------------~--------- --
the collateral, which generally may be enforced against third 
parties. The creditor does not have a fee simple absolute in 
possession, of course, but he does have a "bundle of rights" over 
the collateral. The precise nature of the various rights in the 
bundle is not important for present purposes, but one will be the 
right to recover the debt from the proceeds of the sale of col-
lateral under certain circumstances. 
Although they may seem obvious, three errors are respon-
sible for much of the misanalysis that has taken place on this 
issue. It is a mistake to speak of the Creditors' obtaining the 
rights of unsecured creditors in substitution of their rights as 
secured creditors. This is not a substitution, for they already 
have the rights of unsecured creditors under the Debtors' inde-
pendent contractual obligation to repay the debt. (In a nonre-
course situation, a secured creditor would lack the rights of an 
unsecured creditor.) It is also a mistake to confuse the value 
of the property interest with the value of the contract interest. 
The former is limited by the latter, but if the debt is worth 
more than the collateral, the property interest is limited to the 
value of the collateral. Finally, it is a mistake to think of 
the Creditors' property interests as an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion. They have a bundle of rights, and it is possible for some 
to be lost while others are retained. 
B. Constitutionality under the Takings Clause 
The SG argues at length that §522 is a reasonable exer-
cise of Congress's bankruptcy power. This may be true, but it is 
a separate question whether an otherwise valid regulation oper-
ates as a taking of property requiring compensation. See, e.g., 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 u.s. __ , __ , 
102 S.Ct. 3164, 3171 (1982); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
u.s. 393, 415 (1922). It is undisputed that the "bankruptcy pow-
er, like the other great substantive powers of Congress, is sub-
ject to the Fifth Amendment." Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank 
~ 
v. Radford, 295 u.s. 555, 589 (1935). 
~ 
(1) Radford and its Continued Validity. Radford~~ 
which CAlO relied, is the case most directly on point. There the 
Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Brandeis, considered the 
~- constitutionality of the Frazier-Lemke Act, which limited a mort-
~ gagee's power to foreclose a mortgage on certain farms. The 
~Court specifically identified five rights--five strands in the 
bundle of rights constituting the property interest--that the Act 
denied the mortgagee. Id., at 594-95. But the Act did not de-
stroy the mortgagee's property interest entirely. Its effect was 
~either)postpone the interest by five years, or permit the 
mortgagor to defeat the interest upon payment of what amounted to 
roughly three-quarters of the farm's appraised value. See id., 
bench memo: u.s._ v. Security Industrial Bank page 7. 
at 591-92 & n.21. The Court, finding "that the taking of [the 
five] rights from the mortgagee effects a substantial impairment 
of the security," id., at 595, held that the Act "has taken from 
the [mortgagee] without compensation, and given to [the mortgag-
or], rights in specific property which are of substantial value," 
id., at 601. 
The Frazier-Lemke Act was amended by Congress, and re-
v"'" 
turned to haunt the Court for several years. In Wright v. Vinton 
Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 u.s. 440 
(1937), the Court, in another unanimous opinion by Justice Bran-
deis, upheld the constitutionality of the amended Act. This time 
~ 
the Court found that Congress had undeniably preserved three of 
the rights that the original Act had taken. Id., at 458. And 
Congress sought to preserve all of the mortgagee's rights "so far 
as essential to the enjoyment of his security." Id., at 457. 
The Vinton Branch opinion is somewhat confusing, since 
it speaks of deprivation of property without due process rather 
than taking of property without compensation, even when discuss-
ing Radford. Since Radford was only two years old at the time, I 
find it difficult to believe that the Court intended to retreat 
from its earlier analysis without comment. I would explain the 
confusio~ as follows: In Radford, the deprivation of rights was 
sufficient to constitute a taking. Since there was no compensa-
tion, the Act failed under the Takings Clause. A taking without 
compensation, however, is also a violation of due process, for 
when the deprivation constitutes a taking, the Constitution spec-
ifies that due process requires compensation. In Vinton Branch, 
bench memo: u.s. v. Security Industrial Bank page 8. 
on the other hand, the deprivation was not su f ficient to consti-
tute a taking. It was therefore necessary to continue the analy-
sis, and decide if the deprivation was nevertheless without due 
process. The amended Act survived this challenge, too. Vinton 
Branch does not deny that some impairments of liens will be seri-
ous enough to constitute a taking. 
Two subsequent cases support the view that Radford's 
analysis has not been rejected. In Wright v. Union Central Life 
-------------------
Insurance Co., 311 u.s. 273 (1940), the support is weak dicta. 
The Court was again construing the amended Frazier-Lemke Act. 
(~ 
This time it held that the mortgagor had the right, under the 
Act, to redeem his farm at its apprais~d value. Although the -
mortgagee loses his right to a public sale, he is still protected 
to the extent of the value of the property. The Court noted that 
this was the extent of his constitutional protection. Id., at 
278-79. The Act was constitutional because there was not a sub-
stantial impairment of the security, such as had been found in 
Radford. 
In Armstrong v. United States, 364 u.s. 40 (1960), there 
v 
is stronger support for Radford. There the government's acquisi-
tion of ten ships under construction operated to make certain 
materialmen's liens unenforceable. The Court held that "[t]he 
total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, 
which constitute compensable property, has every possible element 
of a Fifth Amendment 'taking'." Id., at 48. 
The SG argues that the "Court quickly retreated from the 
broad implications of the Radford decision." SG's Brief, at 28. 
He points to Vinton Branch as an example of the retreat, but, as 
noted above, I am unconvinced by this interpretation. At most 
there was a retreat on the question of whether the specific de-
privation effected by the Frazier-Lemke Act was a "taking," but 
even this is doubtful. The original and amended versions were 
simply placed on different sides of the "taking" line. He also 
points to Union Central. Since Union Central protected the mort-
gagee's essential right to the value of the lien, however, any 
erosion is not enough to help the SG here. Finally, the SG cites 
a footnote in Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 u.s. 371, 400-01 n.52 
(1943), as a "candi[d] acknowledge[ment] that [in Radford and 
Vinton Branch] the Court fell into error and was required by Con-
gress to re-examine an earlier decision." SG's Brief, at 29. 
But in fact the footnote is merely given as an example of a case 
where Congress has been willing to enact laws that may requi:;~~ 
the Court to reexamine earlier decisions. ~~ 
I feel confident that the Court has not yet undercut · 
Radford, at least not to the extent claimed by the SG. The Court 
relies on it heavily in Armstrong, 364 u.s., at 44. (The SG does 
~~ not even mention Armstrong in the section of his brief discussed 
~ last paragraph.) In the Iranian claims case, you cited 
Armstrong and Radford for the "settled" principle "that an at-
tachment entitling a creditor to resort to specific property for 
the satisfaction of a claim is a property right compensable under 
the Fifth Amendment." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 u.s. 654, 690 
n.l (1981) (opinion of POWELL, J., concurring}. I think 
the ~Gf4~ 
Court is justified in continuing to rely on Radford. 
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(2) The Application of Radford. Assuming that Radford 
retains its vitality, the next step is to determine if it applies 
here. Certainly the basic facts are essentially the same: Con-
gress has passed a law under its bankruptcy power that deprives a 
secured creditor of a property right in a lien. The SG suggests 
several distinctions, however, so I will examine these in turn. 
First, the Frazier-Lemke Act at issue in Radford was not 
an ordinary bankruptcy law, since it did not dischare any obliga-
tions and did not apply prospectively. The SG seems to be hint-
ing that the Act failed in a balancing process because there was 
not a sufficient public interest. But the Radford Court explic-
itly stated that it did not decide whether the statute was within 
Congress's bankruptcy power. It assumed that it was, and then 
applied a strict property analysis. 295 u.s., at 589, 598-602. 
Second, the mortgage in Radford covered real property. 
~~his distinction must fail, for the lien in Armstrong covered 
~ ~onal property. Furthermore, such a distinction would be dan-
~e~s. Although real property was the primary form of wealth 
~~en the Takings Clause was adopted, and continues to occupy a ~.f 
~~privileged place in Takings Clause doctrine, see, e.g., Loretto, 
~- · supra; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), its 
place in society has generally been replaced by personal proper-
ty. p~~.vz_~~~ 
~ ~~~-~~.~l-4t IJJ.. 
Third, the SG argues that the property interests at is- f 
sue here are insubstantial, since they are generally worth much 
less than the debt and the Creditors do not wish to obtain pos-
session of the collateral. To begin with, there is no support in 
" 
~ .. ~.r 
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the record for the view that the liens are de minimis. On the 
contrary, the parties in Rodrock, one of the cases below, stipu-
lated that the collateral consisted of 15 items (including a sew-
ing machine and a color television) worth $580. Juris stmt app, 
at 17a n.2. In Knezel, the total value was $540. Ibid. (The 
amount of the debt is not clear in either case.) There is no 
theoretical limit on the size of the lien, for §522(d) (3) places 
only a $200 per item limitation on the exemption. A hundred 
items could support a $20,000 lien. And the fact that the Credi-
tors would prefer repayment of the debt to repossession of the 
collateral is not a significant distinction. It is true of al-
most every secured creditor. 
More importantly, the SG's argument misconstrues the 
relevant substantiality. In determining whether a particular 
deprivation of property rights is sufficient to constitute a 
"taking," the Court will often look at the extent to which the 
government's action deprives the person of his property rights. 
In the terms of the familiar analogy, it will decide how many 
strands are taken from the bundle of rights, and whether this 
action destroys the value of the bundle. The Court does not rely 
on the total length of the bundle, nor even the length of the 
strands taken. It is worse for the government to take a person's 
entire interest in a small amount of property, e.g., Armstrong, 
than to take only a portion of a person's interest in very valu-
able property, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 u.s. 104 (1978), even though the former is far less 
valuable in absolute terms. See also Loretto, supra, 458 u.s., 
bench memo: u.s .. v. Security Industrial Bank page 12. 
at __ , 102 S.Ct., at 3176 ("Such an appropriation is perhaps the 
most serious form of invasion of an owner's property inter-
ests .... [T]he government does not simply take a single 'strand' 
from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bun-
dle, taking a slice of every strand.") 
Fourth, the SG argues that the liens are not interests 
in "specific property," but blanket liens covering all of a debt-
ors household goods. This argument is not supported by the facts 
of the case. In at least two of the cases below, it appears that 
the liens are on specific items of property that were identified 
at the time of the security agreement. Furthermore, blanket 
liens are recognized as valid property interests under the Uni-
form Commercial Code. In any event, it would be unworkable to 
hold §522(f) constitutional when applied only to blanket liens. 
Fifth, the SG argues that §522 does not destroy all 
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests, since it 
does not take effect except in bankruptcy, and does not impair 
liens on nonexempt property. While this argument may be relevant 
in determining the reasonableness of the statute, it is irrele-
vant in the Takings Clause context. The government cannot defend 
one taking on the ground that it did not take other property, 
too. The Act in Radford did not destroy all farm mortgages. 
Sixth, the SG argues that the Creditors do not have 
strong, legitimate interests in the liens that are destroyed by 
§522. This argument is based in part on the assumption that they 
should have known that the Bankruptcy Act was about to be amend-
ed, and in part on the Congressional finding that these liens are 
• ;t. 
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often unconscionably obtained by overreaching creditors. 
notice argument is frivolous. The Creditors were entitled to 
rely on the well-established law upholding the rights of secured 
creditors, even in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Irving 
Trust Co., 299 u.s. 445 {1937); Long v. Bullard, 117 u.s. 617 
{1886). The fairness argument is not supported by any evidence 
in the present case. To the extent it is true in the present 
case, §522 is unnecessary, for the liens could be avoided under 
state law. To the extent it is generally true, it is irrelevant 
in the Takings Clause context. A strong public purpose is not 
sufficient to dispense with the compensation requirement. Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 u.s., at 415. 
In sum, I find none of the SG's supposed distinctions 
----------------------~~- ------
between Radford and the present case to be persuasive. In fact, 
the principal distinction that I see suggests that this case is 
much more compelling than Radford. The Frazier-Lemke Act de-
prived mortgagees of five strands from their bundle of rights, 
but it preserved at least some {perhaps most) of the value of 
their security. Here §522 destroys the liens entirely. The 
Creditor in Rodrock loses its $580 security interest, and is left 
with only its unsecured claim, which is worth $1. The Knezel 
Creditor, who loses a $540 lien, would also receive $1 as an un-
secured creditor. Section 522 thus takes a much greater share of 
the Creditors' property interests than the Frazier-Lemke Act did 





{3) The Advisability of Overruling Radford. Even if 
Radford were not directly on point, I would recommend affirming 
Clause cases. The general principles are discussed in Penn Cen-
tral, supra, where the Court identified two factors to be consid-
ered in what is essentially an ad hoc factual inquiry. First is 
the "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, par-
ticularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with 
distinct investment-backed expectations." 438 u.s., at 124. 
Second "is the character of the governmental action." Ibid. 
The "distinct investment-backed expectations" are clear. 
There was unambiguous state law allowing the Creditors to obtain 
enforceable property interests. The bankruptcy law had always 
distinguished between secured and unsecured creditors, and this 
Court had enforced liens in bankruptcy. Relying on these fac-
tors, the Creditors invested money in loans to the Debtors on the 
strength of the security interests at issue here. The economic 
impact of §522 is devestating, as the Creditors have lost all of 
---------------~---~---
their security. The case is thus much stronger than Loretto, ----supra, where the government took a small slice of all the 
strands, or Kaiser Aetna, supra, where the government took the 
entire length of a single strand. Here the government took the 
entire bundle with all the strands. -I find the "character of the governmental action" factor 
to be somewhat puzzling. It does not make any difference that 
the "taking" is for the benefit of the Debtors rather than for 
the immediate use of the government, for "the deprivation of the 
. ( . 
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former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to 
the sovereign constitutes the taking." United States v. General 
Motors, 323 u.s. 373, 378 (1945). The taking in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon was for the benefit of surface owners, the tak-
ing in Kaiser Aetna was for the benefit of Hawaiian boat owners, 
and the taking in Loretto was for the benefit of a cable televi-
sion company. The governmental action here seems little differ-
ent from any of those cases. 
In sum, the principles of Radford are consistent with 
the Court's other Takings cases, and should not be overruled now. 
It should be applied to affirm the present case. 
c. Constitutionality under the Due Process Clause ~ ~ 
The SG focuses his argument on the reasonableness of ~ 
§522, treating this case as turning on substantive due process.~ 
There is confusion in the lower courts on which clause of the 
Fifth Amendment is applicable here, and this Court contributed to 
the confusion with its change of analysis between Radford and 
Vinton Branch. In many respects, though, the due process arg~-
ment is really a straw man. Substantive due process has been 
largely discredited, and it seems highly unlikely that the Court 
would find a due process violation here in the absence of a tak-
ing of compensable property. I mention the issue here, since it 
has been the object of such attention in the case, but I do not 
think that due process analysis adds much to the resolution of 
the issues. If you would like me to discuss this point in great-
er detail, however, I will be happy to do so. ~ / 
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D. The Proper Construction of §522(f) (2) 
In the discussion thus far, I have assumed that §522(f) 
should be construed to apply retroactively. On that construe-
tion, I would recommend holding that the section violates the 
Takings Clause. The Court need not reach this constitutional 
iss~how~, if §522(f) is construed to apply only to liens -- -----created after the enactment of the Code in November 1978. 
CAlO construed §522(f) to have retroactive effect, and 
in the absence of constitutional difficulties, this view has much 
to recommend it. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, §402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682, stated that the Code "shall 
take effect on October 1, 1979" except as otherwise provided. 
The savings provisions, Reform Act §403, provide that cases com-
menced before the effective date shall continue to be governed by 
the Bankruptcy Act rather than the Code. It should have been 
clear to Congress that cases commenced shortly after the effec-
tive date might involve rights vested before the enactment date, 
less than a year before. But there is no explicit provision ex-
cepting §522 (f). 
On the other hand, there is a colorable argument that 
Congress did not intend retroactive application of §522(f), at 
---------------~ ~ ~ 
least to the extent that it would create constitutional ques-
tions. Early drafts of the savings provisions would have explic-
itly required retroactive application in cases such as this, but 
---------------------------------------one of the witnesses testifying before Congress suggested that 
there were constitutional difficulties with the approach. The 
draft provision was eliminated. As the SG correctly notes, the 
bench memo: u.s~ v. Security Industrial Bank 
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witness was one of many, and there were numerous drafting 
changes. It is not clear whether Congress focused on the wit-
ness's statement, or if the change was made in response to it. 
But it is at least a colorable argument, and accepting it would 
allow the Court to avoid the constitutional issue. 
In addition to the straightforward language of the Re-
form Act, there are two other arguments for the proposition that 
Congress intended retroactive application. Neither is compel-
ling. First, the SG contends that denying retroactive applica-
tion "would have postponed for many years a reform long overdue." 
SG's Brief, at 9. The arguments in support of this contention, 
however, relate solely to the need for the reform. Id., at 24-
25. There is nothing to suggest that the reform would be signif-
icantly delayed if §522(f) applied only prospectively. We do not 
have copies of the actual contracts at issue here, but apparently 
they are typically of limited duration. In re Gifford, F. 2d 
__ , __ n. 7 (CA7 1982) (en bane) (Pell, J., dissenting) (36 
month contract). Since long-term debt is not secured by these 
types of liens, most liens created before November 1978 have al-
ready expired by their terms. The one exception would be if the 
same security agreement were used to secure additional extensions 
of credit, but these new extensions would create new rights that 
would be subject to §522 in any event. 
Second, CAlO noted that Reform Act §40l(a) repealed the 
Bankruptcy Act. Thus if §522 does not have retroactive effect, 
there is a "statutory gap." Juris stmt app, at Sa. This argu-
ment fails for several reasons. CAlO overlooked the fact that 
7 
~· . 
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the Bankruptcy Act made no provision for exemptions, or avoiding .~-
liens on exemptions, so its repeal is irrelevant. Prior to 197~ 
state law governed exemptions, and there is no reason it could 
not continue to do so. Congress certainly did not see any prob-
lem with applying state law in this field, since §522(b) (1) ex-
plicitly allows state law to override the federal list of exemp-
t ions, and § 5 22 (b) ( 2) (A) explicitly allows a debtor to claim the 
benefit of state exemptions in lieu of the federal list. (Two-
thirds of the states have opted out of the Code's exemption 
list.) Finally, there is no "gap" problem if only subsection (f) 
is construed to have no retroactive effect. The list of exempt 
property would remain the same, although preexisting liens would 
continue to be recognized. 
The legislative history is fuzzy enough here that the 
statute could be construed either way without great difficulty. 
~ ----------------------------------------Were it not f or the constitutional problems, I would recommend 
construing §522(f) as having retroactive effect, but that course 
does cause serious (even dispositive) constitutional problems. 
"It is well settled that [the] Court will not pass on the 
constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the construction may be 
avoided." United States v. Clark, 445 u.s. 23, 27 (1980). See 
also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 u.s. 490, 500 (1979) ("an Act 
of Congress ought not to be construed to violate the Constitution 
if any other possible construction remains available"). Constru-
ing §522(f) to have only prospective effect may not be the most 
obvious construction, but it is at least "fairly · possible." Per-
bench memo: u.s. v. Security Industrial Bar~ 
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haps it would be the best course to follow here. It would effec-
tively eliminate a constitutional violation without having to 
declare another portion of the Code unconstitutional. 
III. Conclusion 
I recommend that the judgment below be affirmed. Sec-
tion 522(f) operates to deprive the Creditors of their entire 
property interest in the liens without compensation. This is a 
violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Radford is 
directly on point, and is consistent with the Court's more recent 
Takings cases. It may be preferable, however, to construe 
§522(f) as having only prospective effect, and thus avoid reach-
ing this constitutional issue. Such a construction is not the 
most obvious interpretation of the statute, but it is not unrea-
sonable. 
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SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-184 
UNITED STATES, APPELLANT v. SECURITY 
INDUSTRIAL BANK ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
[October -, 1982] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case concerns the effect of 11 U. S. C. § 522(f)(2), 
which permits individual debtors in bankruptcy proceedings 
to avoid liens on certain property. The Court of Appeals 
consolidated seven appeals from the Bankruptcy Courts for 
the Districts of Kansas and Colorado. In each case the 
debtor was an individual who instituted bankruptcy proceed-
ings after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
·95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 ("the Act"), became effective on Octo-
ber 1, 1979. In each case one of the appellees had loaned the 
debtor money and obtained and perfected a lien on the debt-
or's household furnishings and appliances before the Act was 
enacted on November 6, 1978. None of these liens were pos-
. sessory, and none secured purchase-money obligations. 
Included within the personal property subject to the appel-
lees' liens were household items which are exempt from the 
property included within the debtors' estates by virtue of 
subsections (b) and (d) of§ 522. 1 The debtors claimed these 
1 The exemptions were designed to permit individual debtors to retain 
exempt property so that they will be able to enjoy a "fresh start" after 
bankruptcy. 
Subsections (b) and (d) of § 522 provide in pertinent part: 
(b) [A]n individual debtor may exempt from the property of the estate 
81-184-0PINION 
2 UNITED STATES v. SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK 
exemptions in their respective bankruptcy proceedings, rely-
ing on § 522(f)(2) to avoid the liens. That section provides: 
"Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the 
debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the 
debtor in property to the extent such lien impairs an ex-
emption to which the debtor would have been entitled 
under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is-
(2) a nonposessory, nonpurchase-money security in-
terest in any- · 
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing 
apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical in-
struments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the 
personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a de-
pendent of the debtor; 
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the 
trade of the debtor or of a dependent of the debtor; or 
(C) professionally presecribed health aids for the 
debtor or a dependent of the debtor." 
The appellees asserted that application of § 522(f)(2) to 
liens acquired before the enactment date would violate the 
... (1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section. 
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of 
this section: 
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any perticular 
item, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli-
ances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held primar-
ily for the personal, family or household use of the debtor or a dependent of 
the debtor. 
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value, in jew-
elry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor 
.or the dependent of the debtor. 
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in any 
implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the 
trade of a dependent of the debtor. 
(9) Professionally described health aids for the debtor or a dependent of 
the debtor. 
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Fifth Amendment. The United States intervened in each 
case to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute, 2 
but the bankruptcy courts in each case refused to apply 
§ 522(f)(2) to abrogate liens acquired before the enactment 
date. 3 ~ 
The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and affirmed 
the jud~nkruptcy courts. ' 642 F. 2d 1195 
(CAlO 1981). It held that the Act was intended to apply 
retrospectively, and thus was designed to invalidate liens ac-
quired before the enactment date. It also held, however, 
that such an application violates the Fifth Amendment. The 
court stated that § 522(f)(2) effects a "complete taking of the 
secured creditors' property interest," and is thus invalid 
under Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 
U. S. 555 (1935). The United States appealed, and we noted 
probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
The appellees, of course, defend the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 4 The government argues at some length that 
' See 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a). 
3 In Schulte v. Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc., No. 79-11718, and 
Hunter v. Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc., No. 79-11745, the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Kansas noted that retrospective application 
of § 522(f)(2) creates constitutional problems and held that it should be ap-
plied only prospectively. In Jackson v. Security Industrial Bank, No. 80 
C 1078, Stevens v. Liberty Loan Corp., No. 80 Me 0056, Rodrock v. Secu-
rity Industrial Bank, No. 80 M 0014, and Knezel v. Security Industrial 
Bank, No. 80 M 0224, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado 
concluded that § 522(f)(2), as applied retrospectively, violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Hoops v. Freedom Finance, 
No. 80 K 0294, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado con-
cluded that§ 522(f)(2), as applied retrospectively, violates "substantive due 
. process." 
'Appellee Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc. asserts that the judgments 
should be affirmed because the Act violates Article III of the Constitution 
by granting judicial power to non-Article III bankruptcy judges. See 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., -
U. S.- (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at- (REHNQUIST, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). Since we affirm the judgment of the Court of Ap-
-----~-- ~ ----·--------
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retrospective application of § 522(f)(2) to these liens would 
not violate the Fifth Amendment. It contends that the en-
actment is a "rational" exercise of Congress' bankruptcy 
power, that for "bankruptcy purposes" property interests are 
all but indistinguishable from contractual interests, that 
these particular interests were "insubstantial" and therefore 
their destruction does not amount to a "taking" of property 
requiring compensation. We do not decide the constitutional 
question reached by the Court of Appeals. We address it 
only to determine whether the attack on the retrospective 
application of the statute raises substantial enough constitu-
tional doubts to warrant the employment of the canon of stat-
utory construction referred to post, 8--10. 
It may be readily agreed that § 522(f)(2) is a rational exer-
cise of Congress' authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 
4, and that this authority has been regularly construed to au-
thorize the retrospective impairment of contractual obliga-
tions. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 
188 (1902). Such agreement does not, however, obviate the 
additional difficulty that arises when that power is sought to 
be used to defeat traditional property interests. The bank-
ruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition 
against taking private property without compensation. 
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 
(1935). Thus, however "rational" the exercise of the bank-
ruptcy power may be, that inquiry is quite separate from the 
question whether the enactment takes property within the 
· prohibition of the Fifth Amendment. 
The government apparently contends (Brief for the United 
States, at 30-32) that because cases such as Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 
254 (1970) defined "property" for purposes of the Due Proc-
ess Clause sufficiently broadly to include rights which at com-
mon law would have been deemed contractual, traditional 
peals on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to consider this contention. 
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property rights are entitled to no greater protection under 
the takings clause than traditional contract rights. It argues 
that "bankruptcy principles do not support a sharp distinction 
between the rights of secured and unsecured creditors." 
Brief for the United States, at 31. However "bankruptcy 
principles" may speak to this question, our cases recognize, 
as did the common law, that the contractual right of a secured 
creditor to obtain repayment of his debt may be quite differ-
ent in legal contemplation from the property right of the 
same creditor in the collateral. Compare Hanover National 
Bank v. Moyses, supra, with Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Radford, supra, and Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 
444 u. s. 164 (1979). 
Since the governmental action here would result in a com-
plete destruction of the roperty right of the secured )arty, 
the case ts ut aw war y m o the amework o analysis 
employed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U. S. 194 (1978) and PruneYard Shopping Center 
v. Robbins, 447 U. S. 76 (1980), where governmental action 
affected some but not all of the "bundle of rights" which com-
prise the "property" in question. The government argues 
that the interest of a secured party such as was involved here 
is "insubstantial," apparently in part because it is a 
nonpurchase-money, non-possessory interest in personal 
property. The "bundle of rights" which accrues to a secured 
party is obviously smaller than that which accrues to an 
owner in fee simple, but the government cites no cases sup-
porting the proposition that differences such as these rele-
gate the secured party's interest to something less than prop-
erty. 5 And our decisions in Radford, supra, and Armstrong 
• 
6 At oral argument the government conceded that the liens at issue in 
this case are treated as property under state law. Tr. Oral Arg., at 21. 
) 
Both Kansas and Colorado have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Although under the Code the priority among secured parties is often af-
fected by the purchase money or posessory character of security interests, 
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v. United States, 364 U. S. 40 (1961), militate against such a 
prop;n~ 
In ado d we held that the Frazier-Lemke Act, June 28, 
1934, c. 869, i!8 Stat. 1289, violated the takings clause. The 
bank held a nonpurchase-money mortgage on Radford's farm. 
Radford defaulted and instituted bankruptcy proceedings. 
The Frazier-Lemke Act, which by its terms applied only 
retrospectively, permitted the debtor to purchase the prop-
erty at its appraised value regardless of the amount of the 
mortgage. 6 We held the statute was void because it effected 
a "taking of substantive rights in specific property acquired 
by the Bank prior to" its enactment. 295 U. S., at 590. In 
his opinion for the Court, Justice Brandeis stated: 
"[T]he Fifth Amendment commands that, however 
great the Nation's need, private property shall not be 
thus taken even for a wholly public use without just com-
pensation. If the public interest requires, and permits, 
the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order 
to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, re-
sort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so 
that, through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded 
in the public interest may be borne by the public." 
see, e, g. , § 9-312, these characterizations do not affect the nature of the 
security interest. See§§ 9-107 (defining "purchase money security inter-
est"), 9-305 (providing for perfection of security interests by posession). 
· Section 101(28) of the Act defines a lien as a "charge against or interest 
in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." 
It does not make distinctions based on the purchase-money or posessory 
nature of a lien. 
6 The Frazier-Lemke Act permitted the farmer, if the mortgagee as-
sented, to purchase the property at its then appraised value, acquiring 
both title and posession, on a deferred payment plan. If the mortgagee 
refused to assent, the court was required to stay all proceedings for 5 
years, during which time the farmer could retain posession by paying a rea-
sonable rent. After 5 years the property could be reappraised, but the 
farmer still had the right to puchase it free and clear for the appraised 
value regardless of the amount of the lien. See Radford, supra, at 
557-558. 
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Id., at 602. 
In Armstrong, materialmen delivered materials to a prime 
contractor for use in constructing navy personnel boats. 
Under state law, they obtained liens in the vessels. 7 The 
prime contractor defaulted on his obligations to the United 
States, and the government took title to and possession of the 
uncompleted hulls and unused materials, thus making it im-
possible for the materialmen to enforce their liens. We held 
that this constituted a taking: 
"The total destruction by the government of all com-
pensable value of these liens, which constitute compen-
sable property, has every possible element of a Fifth 
Amendment 'taking' and is not a mere 'consequential in-
cidence' of a valid regulatory measure." 
364 U. S., at 48. 
The government seeks to distinguish Armstrong on the 
ground that it was a classical "taking" in the sense that the 
government acquired for itself the property in question, 
while in the instant case the government has simply imposed 
a general economic regulation which in effect transfers the 
property interest from a private creditor to a private debtor. 
While the classical taking may indeed be of the sort that the 
government describes, our cases show that takings analysis 
is not limited t <y<Sutright acquisitions by the government for 
itself. See 'Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
~orp., - U. S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3164 (Jun~, 1982); 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, supra; Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922). 
The government finally contends that because the resale 
value of household goods is generally low, and because credi-
tors therefore view the principal value of their security as a 
iever to negotiate for reaffirmation of the debt rather than as 
7 Under the Uniform Commercial Code definition, these statutory liens 
would be nonposessory, nonpurchase-money liens in personal property. 
See note 5, supra. 
• < 
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a vehicle for foreclosure, the property interests involved here 
do not merit protection under the takings clause. While this 
contention cannot be dismissed out of hand, it seems to run 
counter to the state's characterization of the interest as prop-
erty, see note 5, supra, and to our reliance in other "takings" 
cases on state law characterizations, see, e. g., Kaiser-Aetna 
v. United States, supra, 444 U. S. 164, 179, and also to at 
least some of the implications of Radford, supra, and Arm-
strong, supra. 
The foregoing discussion satisfies us that there is substan- J r-
tial doubt whether the retroactive destruction of the appel-
lees' liens in these cases comports with the Fifth Amend-
ment. We now consider whether, as a matter of statutory 
construction, § ~2(f){2) m~t nee~ be ~plied in t]'lat 
manner. We consider the statutory question because of the 
"'cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain 
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the constitutional question may be avoided.'" 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 577 (1978), quoting Crowell 
v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). 
The Court of Appeals thought § 522(f)(2) must apply retro-
actively, that is, to liens which attached before the enactment 
date because "there would be no bankruptcy law applicable 
to cases involving such liens if it did not. 642 F. 2d, at 1197. 
The court apparently thought that if§ 522(f)(2) does not apply 
to liens which came into existence before the Act was en-
acted, then no part of the Act could apply to cases involving 
such liens. This is not necessarily the case. The liens, of 
course, exist under state law independently of the Act. Al-
though the Act, in general, is effective for all cases com-
menced after its effective date, Congress might have in-
tended that provisions which drastically affect previously 
vested property rights apply only to interests which came 
into effect after the Act was enacted. If § 522(f)(2) is such a 
provision, the remainder of the Act would not affect the 
enforceability of these liens, but would still apply to these 
'. 
--- -- ·- ---
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liens and these cases. We think that the analysis of the 
Court of Appeals did not adequately dispose of the question 
as to the retrospective effect of § 522(f), and we therefore 
pursue the inquiry further. 
The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, J 
while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to 
every law student. Compare Sands, Sutherland's Statutory 
Construction § 106 with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 
622--625 (1965). This Court has often pointed out that 
the first rule of construction is that legislation must be 
considered as addressed to the future, not to the 
past. . . . The rule has been expressed in varying de-
grees of strength but always of one import, that a retro-
spective operation will not be given to a statute which 
interferes with antecedent rights ... unless such be "the 
unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the 
manifest intention of the legislature." 
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S. 
190, 199 (1913) (citations omitted). See e. g., United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U. S. 
306, 314 (1908) ("The presumption is very strong that a stat- ) 
ute was not meant to act retrospectively, and it ought never 
to receive such a construction if it is subceptible of any 
o~her."); United States v·. The Peggy, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 103, 
110 (1801). 
This principle has been repeatedly applied to bankruptcy 
statutes affecting property rights. In Holt v. Henley, 232 
U. S. 637 (1914), the Court had before it a new statute grant-
ing bankruptcy trustees the position of a lienholder with pri-
ority over sellers on conditional sales contracts. Act of June 
25, 1910, c, 412, § 8, 26 Stat. 838, 840. This provision, like 
§ 522(f)(2), could be read literally to divest property interests 
which had been created before it was enacted. The 1910 
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statute, like the Act, applied to all bankruptcy cases insti-
tuted after it became effective. 8 Nonetheless, the Court fol-
lowed the lead of the lower courts in refusing to infer retro-
activity absent an explicitly "expressed intent of Congress." 
Arctic Ice Machine Co. v. Armstrong County Trust Co., 192 
F. 114, 116 (CCA 3 1911). See also In re Schneider, 203 F. 
589, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1913). Iri his opinion for the unanimous 
Court, Justice Holmes stated "that the reasonable and usual 
interpretation of [bankruptcy] statutes is to confine their ef-
fect, so far as it may be, to property rights established after 
they were passed." 232 U. S., at 639. See Auffm'ordt v. 
Rasin, 102 U. S. 620, 622 (1881). 
The government nonetheless contends that bankruptcy 
statutes are usually construed to apply to preexisting rights. 
This statement is unobjectionable in the context of traditional 
contract rights, Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, supra, 
186 U. S., at 188, but none of the cases cited by the govern-
ment extend it to property rights such as those involved 
here. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 
141 (1944), involved rights to certain tax benefits, not to 
property rights. Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 
309 U. S. 382, 383 (1940), dealt with the application of new 
procedural rules to a bankruptcy proceeding that was pend-
ing when the new statute was enacted. Allowing an appeal 
to the Circuit Court rather than the District Court in that 
case did not eliminate any property rights. Carpenter v. 
Wabash Ry., 309 U. S. 23 (1940), involved a provision giving 
personal injury judgments the status of operating expenses 
and thus priority over mortgagees in ongoing railroad reorga-
nizations. . Although that statute may have disadvantaged 
the mortgagees by reducing the amount of cash available to 
pay their notes, it did not affect their property right in the 
8 The transition provisions of the 1910 statute, id., § 14, 36 Stat. at 842, 
are, in substance, the same as those of the Act. Pub. L. No. 9&--598, Title 
IV, §§402, 403(a), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat 2682,2683. 
' . . 
~ i 1 • 
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collateral securing the mortgages. McFaddin v. Evans-
Snider-SueZ Co., 185 U. S. 505 (1902), considered a curative 
statute providing the methods by which valid mortgages 
could be created in the Indian Territory. The Legal Tender 
Cases, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 457, 549-550 (1870), decided only 
that debts could be paid in legal tender as defined by Con-
gress at the time of payment without impairing the obligation 
of contracts. 
Thus the government has not cited, and we have not found, 
any authority casting doubt on the principle of statutory con-
struction deducible from Holt and Auffmordt: No bank-
ruptcy law shall be construed to eliminate property rights 
which existed before the law was enacted in the absence of an 
explicit command from Congress. In light of this principle, 
the legislative history of the 1978 Act suggests that Congress 
may not have intended that § 522(f) operate to destroy pre-
enactment property rights. 
An early version of the Act contained a explicit require-
ment that all its provisions "shall apply in all cases or pro-
ceedings instituted after its effective date, regardless of the 
occurrence of any of the operative facts determining legal 
rights, duties or liabilities hereunder." H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., § 10-103(a) (1975), reprinted in Bankruptcy Act 
Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Right of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), n. 14 
app., at 320-321. This provision may or may not have been 
deleted directly in response to the comments of witness Wil-
liam Plumb to the effect that retroactive invalidation of liens 
may be .an unconstitutional taking. Id., at 206~2067. 
Nonetheless, Congress's elimination of an explicit command 
'is some evidence that it did not intend to depart from the 
usual principle of construction. See Bradley v. Richmond 
School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 716, n. 23 (1974) ("We are reluc-
tant to read into the statute the very . . . limitation that Con-
gress eliminated."). 
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"Accordingly, in the absence of a clear expression of Con-
gress' intent to" apply § 522(f)(2) to property rights estab-
lished before the enactment date, 9 "we decline to construe 
the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to 
resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the 
guarantees of the" takings clause. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 507 (1979). 10 The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals must therefore be 
Affirmed 
9 Because all of the liens at issue in this case were established before 
Congress passed the Act, we have no occasion to consider whether 
§ 522(f)(2) should be applied to liens established after Congress passed the 
Act, but before it became effective. 
10 "When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the stat-
ute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its 
use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' ... 
Obviously there is danger that the courts' conclusion as to legislative pur-
pose will be unconsciously influenced by the judges' own views or by fac-
tors not considered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the dan-
ger is the best assurance of escape from its threat but hardly justifies an 
acceptance of a literal interpretation dogma which withholds from the 
courts available information for reaching a correct conclusion. A few 
words of general connotation appearing in the text of statutes should not be 
given a wide meaning, contrary to a settled policy, 'excepting as a different 
purpose is plainly shown.'" United States v. American Trucking Associa-
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Dear Bill: 
I shall be writing a dissent in this case in due course. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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As you may recall from the Conference discussion, 
I have flip-flopped on this case more than once. I 
ended up with a vote to reverse, but I find your 
opinion especially persuasive, particularly your 
reliance on Justice Holmes' opinion in Holt v. Henley, 
232 U.S. 637, a case that seems to be squarely in 
point. I am therefore inclined to join your opinion, 
but since I did vote the other way I believe I should 
withhold a final commitment until I have the benefit of 
whatever other writing may circulate. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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Re: No. 81-184, United States v. Security Industrial Bank 
Justice O'Connor has suggested that the opinion in this 
case be revised to deal explicitly with the issue of the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. I agree and suggest 
rewriting the last sentence of footnote 4 to read as 
follows: 
Because our decision in Northern Pipeline is 
prospective only, id., at , and because we have 
stayed the issuance-of our mandate in that case to 
December 24, 1982, u.s. , that decision 
does not affect the judgment-u1 this case. 
As I recall, the issue was not addressed in our 
conference discussion of the case. I am circulating this 
memo to the entire conference, not just to those who voted 
to affirm, because it seems to me that one's views on this 
issue would not depend on one's views on the merits. I 
propose to incorporate the above revision unless I am 
advised that it will not command the support of a majority 
of the conference. 
Sincerely, 
October 22, 1982 
81-184 u.s. v. ~ecurity Industrial Bank 
Dear Bill: 




cc: The Conference 
Ili 1: I have requested my law clerk Mike Sturley to discuss 
a couple of minor points with your clerk. I like your 
opini.on. It makes a stronger case 'for prospective 
conF.truction of S522(f) (2) than I had thought possible. 
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Re: 81-184 - United States 
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Dear Bill, 
I shall await the dissent in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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Re: 81-184 - United States 
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Dear Bill, 
I now join your proposed opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
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